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I. Introduction 
The past quarter century has been a period of tremendous educationai 
growth in developing countries. During the period from 1960 to 1985, 
primary school enrollments in developing states rose 50 percent, from 
60.7 percent of the primary-school-aged population in 1960 to 91.5 percent 
in 1985.1 Secondary enrollments tripled from 12.6 percent of the secondary-
school-aged population in 1960 to 38.4 percent in 19S5.2 And enrollments 
in tertiary education quadrupled from 2.1 percent of 20-24-year-olds in 
1960 to 8.8 percent in 1985.5 National expenditures for education in 
developing states showed paralleled increases during the period from 
1970 to 1983, growing from 2.9 percent of the developing world's gross 
national product (GNP) in 1970 to 4.0 percent of its GNP in 1983.4 
Despite the expansion of education in the developing world, devel­
opment planners, educators, and education development researchers cite 
numerous problems with educational systems (including problems of access, 
quality, cost, and design)1 and express disappointment at the apparent 
failure of educational expansion to decrease dependency, reduce inequities, 
or to promote economic growth.6 The litany of problems characterizing 
1 U nesco, Unesco Statistical Year book (New York: United Nations, 1985), p. 11-32. 
2 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., sec. 2, p. 36. 
5 L. H. Kaluba, "Education in Zambia: The Paradox of the Public School Solution," Comparative 
Education 22, no. 2 (1986): 159—69; Philip H. Coombs, Future World Critical Issues in Educational 
Development: A Report of Preliminary Findings (Pr inceton, N.J.: International Council for Educational 
Development [ICED], 1981); Hermes J. Mosha, "The Role of African Universities in National De­
velopment: A Critical Analysis," Comparative Education 22 , no. 2 (1986): 93-109; Hollis Chenery, 
Montek S. Ahluwalia, C. L. G. Bell, J. H. Duloy, and R. Jolly, Redistribution with Growth ( London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974); Robert L. Ayres, Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World 
Poverty (Cambridge, Mass.: Mil Press, 1983); Kevin Lillis and Desmond Hogan, "Dilemmas of 
Diversification: Problems Associated with Vocational Education in Developing Countries," Comparative 
Education 19, no. 1 (1983): 89-107. 
iJ Coombs points out a weak association between economic development and educational expansion, 
noting that economic growth lags far behind educational growth in most developing states. See Philip 
H. Coombs, The World Crisis in Education: The View from the Eighties (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985). Sica and Prechel similarly fail to find a relationship between educational development 
and economic growth. See Alan Sica and Harland Prechel, "National Political-Economic Dependency 
Comparative Education Review, vol. 33, no. 1. 
© 1989 by the Comparative and International Education Society. All rights reserved. 
0010-4086/89/3301 -0003$01.00 
Comparative Education Review 3 
NAGEL AND SNYDER 
education systems in developing states and plaguing educational planners 
and project implementers reveals the weakness of educational development 
as an engine of social, economic, and political change. When seen in this 
light, the question is not why educational expansion has failed to promote 
economic growth, to reduce social inequalities, or to establish participatory 
political systems. The question is, Why, in the face of large investments 
of human and capital resources, are education systems in such disarray— 
what is going wrong with the educational development process? 
The following pages concentrate on the question of what goes wrong 
in educational development. The findings reported here are based on a 
detailed analysis of one case, the West African country of Liberia during 
the period from 1972 to 1985.7 This effort to identify the impediments 
to educational development, focuses on a major set of actors in the de­
velopment process—-international funding agencies. We outline the ways 
in which development projects sponsored by international funding agencies 
shaped and often distorted organizational aspects of the Liberian education 
system during the 14-year period under investigation. We believe that 
the Liberian case is not unique, that similar problems inevitably result 
from internationally funded development efforts wherever they occur. 
II. Liberian Educational Development, 1970—85 
Liberian patterns of educational development parallel those of other 
developing countries. During the period from 1970 to 1980, Liberian 
primary enrollments of children aged 6-11 grew by nearly one-half from 
56 percent in 1970 to 76 percent in 1980.8 Secondary enrollments of 
in the Global Economy and Educational Development," Comparative Education Review 25 (October 
1981): 384-402. Psacharapoulos, Weis, and Kaluba provide arguments and evidence for education's 
perpetuation or even the increase of social inequalities in developing countries. See George Psa­
charapoulos, "The Perverse Effects of Public Subsidization of Education: Or How Equal Is Free 
Education?" Comparative Education Review 21 (February 1977): 69—90; Lois Weis, "Education and 
the Reproduction of Inequality: The Case of Ghana," Comparative Education Review 23 (February 
1979): 41-50; Kaluba. Carnoy and Berman argue that the design and control of information systems 
and educational development projects by developed states tend to perpetuate Third World dependency. 
See Martin Carnoy, Education as Cult ural Imperialism (N ew York: McKay, 1974); Edward Berman, 
"Foundations of United States Foreign Policy and African Education, 1945—1975," Harvard Educational 
Review 49 (May 1979): 145—79. Kelly and Altbach and Mazrui make parallel arguments pointing to 
the legacy of colonial educational institutions and curricula in the subordination of Third World 
education systems. See Gail P. Kelly and Philip G. Altbach, "Introduction," and Ali Mazrui, "The 
African University as a Multinational Corporation: Problems of Penetration and Dependency," in 
Education and Colonialism, ed. G. P. Kelly and P. G. Altbach (New York: Longman, 1978). Finally, 
Payer argues that educational development assistance programs are designed less to maximize de­
velopment than to maintain existing unequal international economic relations and to benefit offshore 
economic interests. See Cheryl Payer, The World Bank: A Critical Analysis (New York: Monthly Review, 
1982). 
7 This research was conducted during our tenure in Liberia, where Nagel was a Fulbright scholar 
at the University of Liberia and at the Ministry of Education (1984/85) and where Snyder was a 
technical advisor at the Ministry of Education (1983/85). 
8 Unesco (n. 1 above), sec. 3, p. 28. 
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chiidren aged 12-17 more than doubled during the same period, from 
10 percent in 1970 to 23 percent in 1980.9 And tertiary enrollments of 
those aged 20—24 nearly tripled from less than 1 percent in 1970 to 2.5 
percent in 1980.10 Increases in student enrollments were accompanied 
by increases in the number of teachers and in the number of schools. In 
1970, there were 4,048 primary and secondary, public and private school 
teachers;11 by 1984, the number of primary and secondary teachers had 
increased 17 percent to 4,742 (a significant increase, though it failed to 
keep up with student enrollment expansion).12 The number of schools 
also grew during the 1970-84 period, increasing 41 percent from 887 
primary and secondary schools in 1970 to 1,251 primary and secondary 
schools in 1984.13 
Ironically, just as these figures mirror those cited above for all developing 
countries, so too do the types and magnitude of problems underlying 
these expansive data. The Liberian education sector suffers from a shortage 
of trained teachers, problems with curriculum development, usage, and 
relevancy, limited access to education, lack of instructional materials, poor 
supervision, weak administration, and inadequate vocational and technical 
education.14 The list is essentially identical to those problems researchers 
identify as confronting most developing countries. Like those of other 
developing states, Liberia's educational development problems bear witness 
to their depth and tenacity. 
Although Liberia became the African continent's first independent 
state in 1847, any systematic efforts at national educational development 
did not begin until the 1950s when, under President W. V. S. Tubman's 
Unification Policy,15 Liberia began an unprecedented expansion of its 
educational facilities, assisted in large part by foreign aid.16 The first 
decade of Liberian educational development was reviewed by a U.S. Agency 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Public schools are government operated. Private schools include religious and mission schools, 
concession-run schools, and private schools. Most private schools are subsidized by the government 
of Liberia. 
12 Data for 1984 were obtained from an extensive survey of schools conducted by the Ministry 
of Education's Division of Information Systems and Data Services and are considered to be significandy 
more reliable than the possibly inflated 1970 data. 
,s Conrad W. Snyder, Jr., and Joane Nagel, The Struggle Continues! World Bank and African 
Development Bank Investments in Liberian Educational Development, 1972—1985 (McLean, Va.: Institute 
for International Research, 1986), pp. 56—61. 
14 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Education and Training Sector Assessment 
(Monrovia: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs and USAID/Liberia, 1983); C. W. Snyder, 
jr., and S. Ju, Architecture for Progr ess (McLean, Va.: Institute for International Research, 1984). 
15 Tubman's Unification Policy was designed to begin integration of Liberia's vast majority (over 
95 percent) indigenous population into a social, economic, and political system separated from parallel 
indigenous institutions and dominated by an immigrant "settler" or "Americo-Liberian" population. 
16 Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969); 
R. D. Clower, G. Dalton, and M. Harwitz, Growth without Developm ent: An Economic Survey of Liberia 
(Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1966). 
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for International Development-sponsored evaluation team; the evaluation 
was a depressing harbinger of subsequent Liberian- and foreign-sponsored 
assessments: 
What is disturbing about Liberia is not that ten years have failed to produce a 
good educational system, but that ten years have failed to produce even the 
foundations of such a system. The reasons are not entirely clear. One can point 
to numerous instances of inefficiency, corruption, and incompetence in the de­
velopment and operation of the expanding system of government schools; but 
difficulties of this kind are common to most developing economies and do not 
afford an adequate explanation of Liberia's peculiar backwardness in the educational 
field. It can also be argued that Liberia has not spent enough on education in 
recent years; but this argument is hard to defend, for one might with equal force 
contend that had twice as much money been spent, twice as much would have 
been wasted.17 
While Clower and his associates did not successfully solve the puzzle 
of Liberia's educational development problems, their analysis remained 
apt, if somewhat overstated,18 nearly 2 decades later when we participated 
in a Liberian Ministry of Education—sponsored assessment of World Bank 
and African Development Bank (referred to hereafter as "Bank Group") 
projects.19 Our report stated, "The picture of Liberian education is a 
limited-access and high-wastage system that is expanding, but not fast 
enough to assimilate a greater proportion of a fast-growing population. . . . 
Bank Group investments . .. may have helped Liberia from losing more 
ground in meeting the educational needs of its populace, but little in the 
way of progress can be claimed.'20 
As portrayed by the above reports, the Liberian educational development 
landscape looked uniformly bleak despite increases in enrollments and 
the number of teachers and schools.21 The incongruity between educational 
expansion on the one hand and education system disarray on the other 
hand leads to the inevitable question of what is wrong with Liberian 
education—why have 3 decades of development efforts produced so little 
successful education design and delivery? The answers are complex and, 
like the problems, not unique to Liberian education: a poor infrastructure 
in a poor nation; a borrowed design for schooling ranging from buildings 
to teacher training to curricula; an inefficient and often neglectful, often 
17 Clower et al„ p. 345. 
18 In hindsight, it would be hard to argue now that either Liberia's educational "backwardness" 
or its slow development was peculiar, th ough perhaps extreme. 
19 The term "Bank Group' is used here to refer to the combined investments of the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank. In Liberia there were four Bank Group projects, two of 
which were funded by both the World Bank and the African Development Bank (in 1976 and 1982). 
20 Snyder and Nagel, p. 48. 
21 Researchers have reported some successes, e.g., the USAID-sponsored Monrovia Consolidated 
School System (MCSS), established in the 1960s, and the Bank Group-sponsored Mano River Union 
Forestry Training Institute (FTI), established in the 1970s, were reported to be operating well (Snyder 
and Nagel; USAID). 
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self-interested, educational administrative apparatus lacking in supervision 
and unable to exert control over a teaching staff that is poorly trained, 
seldom paid, and part of a profession that labors in an environment of 
low material and status rewards. 
Reports of problems like these abound in the literature on educational 
development and are valid factors impeding development progress. How­
ever, like the aggregate statistics that depict a misleading pattern of ed­
ucational expansion, these factors do not tell the whole story. Indeed, 
they are less explanations than they are factors themselves to be explained. 
To accept such problems as inefficiency, neglect, corruption, disorgani­
zation, absenteeism, or incompetency as the primary explanations for 
underdevelopment leaves researchers and educational planners at a dead 
end. An illuminating analysis should explain the persistence or even the 
production of these problems. The next section of this article explicates 
the ways in which one important aspect of educational development— 
international funding of development projects—contributes to and some­
times creates some of the most persistent and vexing educational devel­
opment problems. 
III. Liberian Education as a Loosely Coupled System 
In the 1970s, organizational theorists challenged the traditional view 
of organizations as rationally planned and operated, bureaucratically and 
efficiently structured, and possessed of clear and identifiable functions 
and boundaries. After researchers documented the fluid, often apparently 
irrational and inefficient structures of many organizations, there emerged 
an alternate understanding of organizations as "loosely coupled," that is, 
flexible, unplanned, decentralized, and diversely structured.22 Researchers 
cited a number of characteristics of loosely coupled systems: lack of re­
lationship among resources, production, and demands; causal indepen­
dence—inputs unrelated to outputs; redundancy—several means or units 
to achieve the same results; slow or absent coordination among units; 
mismatch between organizational chart and unit activity; concealment 
and poor surveillance opportunities/capabilities; absence of linkages among 
units; failure to implement rules; frequent and unpunished violations of 
rules; decentralization of authority. 
Meyer and Rowan, in particular, have argued that loose coupling 
accurately characterizes American schooling, where there are pluralistic 
systems of control, but perhaps less accurately characterizes British and 
22 Karl E. Weick, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems," Administrative Science 
Quarterly 21 (1976): 1-19; M. R. Davis, T. E. Deal, J. W. Meyer, B. Rowan, W. R. Scott, and E. A. 
Stackhouse, eds., The Structure of Educational Systems: Explorations in the Theory of Loosely-Coupled Or­
ganizations (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University, Center for Research and Development in Teaching, 
1977). 
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Continental educational systems, where control is centralized and resides 
in ministries of education.23 Many aspects of Liberian society are influenced 
by the American model; however, the educational system is ostensibly 
tightly structured under its national Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, 
in the course of our 1985 Bank Group assessment for the Liberian Ministry 
of Education (MOE), we observed fractionalization, lack of coordination, 
and drift in the education sector as a whole, and the same problems within 
and among the various education subsectors (primary education, secondary 
education, tertiary education, vocational/technical education, teacher 
training, curriculum development, supervision, and administration). 
Teaching was an autonomous activity often divorced from any cur­
riculum, instructional materials, or supervision. The pieces of schooling 
often failed to come together or else converged in an unexpected manner. 
We observed schools with no principals, no teachers, no instructional 
materials, and/or no students. We observed single buildings with more 
than one school, each with its own name, principal, uniforms, teaching 
staff, and student body. We observed teacher training programs operating 
without nationally approved textbooks, learning a curriculum different 
from the national curriculum, and producing graduates who planned and 
pursued nonteaching careers. We observed competing national systems 
of primary education, sponsored by different international agencies, each 
with its own schools, teacher training programs, supervisory systems, cur­
ricula, and instructional materials. We observed dissociation among the 
contents of (a) the national curriculum, (b) the national textbooks, and 
(c) the national examinations (not surprisingly accompanied by poor national 
high school exam results).24 
Further, we observed incongruities between the described and actual 
functions of many units in the Ministry of Education: a research division 
and a planning division whose work was routinely conducted by other 
units and by Liberian and international staff scattered throughout the 
ministry; a statistics division whose work was conducted by a unit created 
by a Bank Group development project; and an IBM unit created by 
another development grant, no longer functioning, but still staffed. 
In addition, we noted jurisdictional ambiguities and conflicts between 
units within the Ministry of Education over control of primary schooling, 
science and vocational/technical schooling, the development and publication 
23 John Meyer and Brian Rowan, "The Structure of Educational Organization," in Organizational 
Environment: Ritual and Rationality, ed. J. W. Meyer and W. R. Scott (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); 
John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony," American Journal of Socio logy 83, no. 2 (1977): 340-63. 
24 C. O. Agbenyega, Grace Morris, and Annette Henry, "The Liberia National Examinations 
and Standard Setting," in Final Report of the 1984 National Policy Conference on Education and Training 
(Monrovia: Ministry of Education, 1984), pp. 249-67. 
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of instructional materials, the sale of textbooks, and the administration 
of development projects. These jurisdictional problems extended outside 
the MOE as well, pitting the Ministry of Education against other ministries 
and agencies over such educational issues as planning (MOE's Department 
of Planning and Development vs. the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Affairs), technical and vocational/technical education (MOE's Division of 
Science and Technical Education vs. the Ministry of Youth and Sport vs. 
the Bank Group-supported Agricultural and Industrial Training Board), 
and school construction (the MOE's Bank Group—created Division of 
Educational Facilities vs. the Ministry of Public Works). 
Finally, we noted a gap between the official rules and procedures 
governing the education sector and the actual operation of education in 
Liberia: salary scales that were approved but not implemented; official 
student-teacher ratios (45:1 for primary, 40:1 for secondary) that were 
not enforced;25 school operating schedules (days and hours open) that 
were not adhered to; and teacher salary payments that were repeatedly 
delayed. 
While no system, education or otherwise, whether in a developing or 
developed state, operates completely smoothly or works exactly as planned,k6 
the extent of fragmentation, conflict, and drift in Liberian education was 
so great that it was difficult to view the state of affairs as accidental. 
Ironically, the chaos seemed ordered, organized in a way that suggested 
that systematic forces were at work, forces that were pulling the education 
sector apart. 
Once again, organization theory was relevant. Liberian education re­
sembled what Ackoff, Finnel, and Gharajedaghi termed a "mess"—a bundle 
of interacting problems.2' The interesting point they make is that, while 
a mess is complex, it is not chaotic. A mess is a system of problems: it is 
not random, it has an internal organization and logic, and it results from 
a process that is potentially explicable. 
When viewed as a logical system, a thread of commonality could be 
seen running through the various problems constituting the Liberian 
education "mess." That commonality was the direct or indirect involvement 
of international funding agencies in so many of the problems of coordination 
and control described above. 
There are three ways in which the international funding of educational 
development projects decouples education systems: (1) the policies that 
25 £ Tarpeh, "Government Clamps Down on Schools," Liberian Educational Persp ectives 1, no. 
1 (1984): 9. 
26 The Liberian education sector is not unique in its loose coupling. Smilarly extensive characteristics 
have been reported in the Liberian agricultural sector. See USAID, Institutional Profile: Liberian 
Agriculture (Monrovia: USAID/Liberia, 1984). 
27 R. L. Ackoff, E. V. Finnel, and J. Gharajedaghi, A Guide to Controlling Your Corporation's Future 
(New York: Wiley, 1984). 
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guide development agencies (in particular, policy conflicts and discontin­
uities among multiple agencies and within a single agency over time); (2) 
the structure of development projects (especially as a result of development 
agencies' preferences for establishing new units and agencies in the ed­
ucation sector); and (3) competition for control of development funds (both 
among recipient units and agencies and among international funding 
agencies themselves). The following sections discuss these three mechanisms 
and illustrate the ways in which they worked to fragment the Liberian 
education sector. 
IV. Educational Development Agency Policies 
Organizations have their own internal dynamics that shape their dealings 
with the external environment. Development agencies are no exception. 
Much has been written about the content and evolution of World Bank 
development policies.28 In its early development activities, the World 
Bank emphasized formal, particularly tertiary, education.29 The entrance 
of Robert S. McNamara as president in the late 1960s resulted in a shift 
in World Bank education policy to soften the boundaries of loan-eligible 
areas. The publication of the first comprehensive education policy paper 
in 1971 recommended a systematic study of the entire education sector 
as a prerequisite for financing, '" noting that "the most serious gap affecting 
everything else has been the management capability-—organization, plan­
ning, evaluation, supervision—needed to meet the challenge of expan­
sion,"51 and recommending lending activities be confined to the "established 
areas" of technical, agricultural, and teacher training and general secondary 
education. 
The power of World Bank policy to shape not only its own development 
projects but also to influence the course of development policy formulation 
in other agencies is often noted, sometimes critically.32 That power was 
reflected in the pattern of Bank Group education projects in Liberia. The 
Bank Group's First Education Project in Liberia was appraised in 1972 
in the amount of $9.6 million.35 The total amount was divided between 
projects in two categories: (1) educational planning and administration 
28 Robert L. Ayres (n. 5 above); Sohrab Shahabi, "The World Bank as an Agent of Change, 
with Particular Reference to the Issue of Population" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1982); Edward 
S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods ( Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1973). 
29 Ayres, p. 5; Wadi D. Haddad, "The World Bank's Education Sector Policy Paper: A Summary," 
Comparative Education 17 (June 1981): 127—39. 
30 World Bank, "Education: Sector Working Paper" (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1971). 
31 Ibid., p. 11. 
32 Ayres, pp. 2, 19-20, 36; Payer (n. 6 above); Shahabi, p. 140. 
33 World Bank, "Appraisal of a First Education Project in Liberia" (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1972). 
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TABLE 1 
PROBLEMS IDE NTIFIED B Y BANK GROUP PR OJECT APP RAISALS AND RE LATED ED UCATION PROJ ECT 
COMPONENTS FUNDE D 
Project Components 
First Project Second Project Third Project Fourth Project 
Need to Improve (1972) (1976) (1977) (1982) 
Educational planning X X X X 
Educational administration X X X X 
Curriculum development X X 
X Testing X 
Instructional materials X X 
Teacher training X X X X 
Primary school facilities X X 
Secondary school facilities X X 
Tertiary school facilities* X 
Vocational/technical school facilities X X X 
Adult education X 
* Includes funding for the University of Liberia's College of Agriculture and Forestry. 
and (2) secondary and tertiary teacher training and agricultural and vo­
cational/technical education facilities. 
Table 1 displays the various project components for the four Bank 
Group projects. As we can see from the table, the first project exactly 
reflected the 1971 World Bank sector paper's emphasis on education 
sector analysis and planning and on the construction of postprimary tech­
nical education and teacher training facilities. No primary schools or 
"software" (curriculum development, instructional materials) were included. 
The Bank Group's Second Education Project in Liberia was appraised 
in 1976.34 The second project bore little resemblance in intent to the first 
project. As we can see from table 1, only three of the nine components 
of the second project were continuations of components funded under 
the first project. Of the $5.4 million loan, three-fifths was allocated to 
primary schooling (building construction, instructional materials, curricu­
lum development), and the remainder was divided among teacher training, 
adult education, and educational administration. The shift away from 
secondary and tertiary education toward primary schooling was no accident. 
It can be traced directly to the 1974 publication of two World Bank-
sponsored documents: a bank education-sector working paper and Chen-
ery et al.'s Redistribution with Growth}5 These policy volumes emphasized 
the importance of primary schooling in educational development, an 
54 World Bank, "Appraisal of a Second Educadon Project: Liberia" (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1976). 
35 Chenery et al. (n. 5 above); World Bank, "Educadon Sector Working Paper" (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1974). 
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emphasis that was reflected in the Bank Group's Liberian education projects 
that followed. 
The next two Bank Group projects in Liberia were the Third Education 
Project, appraised in 1977, and the Fourth Education Project, appraised 
in 1982.36 As can be seen in table 1, these projects retained the Bank 
Group emphasis on primary schooling and educational planning and 
administration, increased support for vocational/technical education, and 
all but abandoned secondary and tertiary education. 
The changing emphases of Bank Group policy contributed greatly to 
the expansion of primary education, but also exacerbated certain discon­
tinuities in other parts of the education sector. Some of these discontinuities 
are evident in table 1. There we see one-time funding of tertiary school 
construction and adult education and two-time funding of primary and 
secondary school construction, curriculum development, testing, and in­
structional materials. Only teacher training and educational administration 
and planning were funded in three or more of the four Bank Group 
projects. The limited funding was not contingent on the well-being of 
these elements, so the loss of financial/technical emphasis was a serious 
handicap to sustained development. 
Furthermore, multiple project funding for a particular component 
did not guarantee similarity of content in what was funded. For instance, 
both testing and instructional materials were funded twice under the 
second and fourth projects. However, in both cases the second phase of 
funding virtually ignored the first. In the case of testing, the second 
project's testing division was superseded by the fourth project's support 
for the West African Examinations Council. In the case of instructional 
materials, the second project's publications unit was superseded by the 
fourth project's textbook unit. 
The changing emphases of World Bank policy had the positive effect 
of contributing greatly to the expansion of primary education, particularly 
in terms of school construction.37 However, shifts in World Bank policy 
also created certain discontinuities in other parts of the education sector,38 
For instance, under the First Education Project (1972), two multilateral 
high schools (MLHSs) designed to provide instruction in science and 
56 World Bank, "Appraisal of a Third Education Project: Liberia" (Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 1977); "Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Liberia Fourth Education Project" (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 1982). 
s* The bank's preference for "hardware," i.e., construction, has been a basis for some criticism. 
See Ayres, p. 25; and Payer, p. 231. 
38 The problems for development of changing policies have been noted by a number of researchers, 
e.g., Aart Van de Laar, The World Bank and the Poor ( Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), p. 1; John 
Simmons, The Educational Dilemma: Po licy Issues for Developin g Countries (Lo ndon: Pergamon, 1980); 
Jonathan E. Sanford, U.S. Foreign Policy and Multilateral Development Banks (Boulder: Westview, 1982), 
pp. 23—24; Brian Holmes, "Paradigm Shifts in Comparative Education," Comparative Education Review 
28 (1984): 584-604. 
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vocational/technical subjects were built in the two regional cities of Zwedru 
and Voinjama. The MLHSs were intended to improve regional student 
access to science and vocational/technical education. The cessation of 
funding following the early 1970s shift in bank policy toward primary 
education left the MLHSs without adequate science and vocational education 
equipment and staff. While the buildings were indeed built, the concept 
of the MLHS program was lost, and only very expensive, but traditional, 
high schools remained. 
With a return to recognition of the importance of vocational/technical 
training in the late 1970s, the Bank Group resumed its willingness to 
fund Liberian science and vocational/technical education projects. However, 
instead of concentrating efforts on rescuing the foundering MLHSs, the 
decision was made to construct four new science and technology centers 
(STCs) in four other regional cities under the Third Education Project 
(1977). The fate of the STCs is discussed below. 
Another casualty of changes in Bank Group policies was the University 
of Liberia's College of Forestry and Agriculture (COAF). The early Bank 
Group emphasis on agricultural education was not maintained, and con­
sequently the COAF, built under the first project, lost important support 
and was seriously underutilized and barely operational at the time of the 
1985 assessment. The COAF's problems were further exacerbated by the 
Bank Group-financed construction and staffing of the Mano River Union 
Forestry Training Institute (FTI) under the second and third projects. 
The FTI competed with the COAF for scarce staff, finances, and students, 
and contributed to COAF's decline. 
This pattern of setting up one unit, subsequently failing to support 
it, and frequently undermining the unit by setting up a competitor, was 
a pattern we observed over and over in our assessment work. The pattern 
was not always the result of changes in policy over time. In some instances 
new (sometimes competing) institutional units were established as part of 
an explicit development strategy by development agencies. The following 
two sections discuss this strategy and its consequences in more detail. 
V. The Creation of Autonomous Units in Development Projects 
The World Bank has a documented preference for establishing au­
tonomous units as part of its blueprint for development,39 Van de Laar 
describes the intent behind the creation of these new units: "[To] cut 
across the many lines of independent and often conflicting autonomy or 
authority, and to coordinate activities."40 The intent is understandable, 
39 Van de Laar, p. 189; Payer, p. 108; A. Fatouros, "The World Bank," in The Impact of International 
Organizations on Legal and Institutional Change in Developing Countries, ed. J. B. Howard (New York: 
International Legal Center, 1977), p. 57. 
40 Van de Laar, p. 189. 
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given the difficulties in trying to conduct change within any bureaucracy. 
However, this strategy for "cutting through the red tape" resulted in a 
vastly more complex set of conflicting authorities and many more problems 
of coordinating activities. In other words, a worsening of precisely the 
original problems. 
In addition to the schools constructed under the Bank Group projects, 
the four Bank Group Liberian education projects created 20 new units 
in the Liberian education sector. Most of these units were involved in 
educational administration and planning. Many of them duplicated or 
monopolized the functions of other units. For instance, the Project Im­
plementation Unit (PIU) was established under the First Education Project. 
Its duties were to administer the Bank Group education projects. It operated 
as an autonomous unit within the MOE, with its director reporting directly 
to the Minister of Education, thus bypassing intermediate authorities. 
This autonomy was efficient in some ways but problematic in others. The 
lack of supervision of PIU activities led to questions regarding its accounting 
procedures and the allocation of funds. Further, PIU isolation led to a 
communication breakdown and subsequent problems of coordination. 
Due to a lack of information about project status, the activities of other 
units of the MOE responsible for various aspects of different projects 
were delayed and uncoordinated. For instance, equipment delivered to 
the STCs sat unopened in boxes for months during and after construction 
because those responsible for unpacking them were unaware of their 
arrival. 
Many of the problems of conflicting jurisdictions cited above were the 
result of Bank Group—created agencies duplicating or encroaching on 
the functions of other units. The most common approach to problem 
solving was to create a new unit. This strategy was used to deal with 
problems of instructional materials. Under the second project a publications 
unit was created in the MOE to draft textbooks and other instructional 
materials. When the output was not satisfactory, fourth project planners 
decided to use outside publishers and created a new textbook unit for 
textbook distribution. The publications unit was simply retained, a relic 
of an earlier project. 
The strategy of creating autonomous agencies was not always a failure. 
The Division of Educational Facilities (DEF) was created under the First 
Education Project. Its function was to oversee the design and construction 
of Bank Group project buildings. Although it was resented by officials at 
the Ministry of Public Works, the DEF generally accomplished its goals. 
It did share some similar problems with the PIU in that its autonomy 
from the rest of the MOE tended to lead to communication and coordination 
problems. 
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The establishment of new, often autonomous units by development 
planners often results in the duplication of functions, jurisdictional prob­
lems, and system fragmentation. As we have seen, these problems can 
arise when only one funding agency is involved. When we expand the 
scope of our analysis to include the many other funding agencies that 
populate the Liberian educational development landscape, the problems 
of competition, conflict, and fragmentation multiply. 
VI. Competition for Control of Development Funds 
Two sorts of competition for control of development funds create 
problems for the education sector: (1) competition among units within 
the sector for allocation and control of funds and (2) competition among 
international development agencies for control of the sector. 
A. Internal Competition for Development Funds 
In all countries and in all private and public sectors there is much 
tension and conflict surrounding the effort to obtain resources for staff 
and program development. This is particularly true in developing states 
where resources can be desperately scarce. While battles are fought over 
national resources, often patterns of accommodation are worked out over 
time that tend to stabilize competition. This is less often the case with 
international resources due to their irregular availability and windfall 
nature. The competition for external funds among various ministries and 
among units within single ministries is one way in which local education 
planners collaborate with international agencies in fractionalizing education 
systems.41 When First Education Project appraisers arrived in Liberia, the 
state of affairs in education was desperate. The importance of international 
funding to Liberian educational planners is evident when the amount of 
the World Bank loan for the First Education Project in 1972 ($9.6 million) 
is compared to the total Liberian government expenditures for education 
in 1970 ($13.8 million). A development loan equaling 70 percent of public 
expenditures for education was simply irresistible to Liberian educational 
administrators.42 As a high-level Ministry of Education official told us, 
"Then, we would take anything they offered because we needed everything." 
While officials at the MOE had their own agenda for building and 
improving the education system, they felt they were in a weak bargaining 
41 Ibid., pp. 201 and 236. 
42 The relative amounts (as percentages of government expenditures on education) of the three 
subsequent Bank Group loans declined but remained significant parts of the Liberian education 
budget. In 1983, Liberian government education expenditures were $89.9 million; World Bank and 
African Development Bank loans for the Fourth Education Project, begun in 1982, represented an 
additional $23.3 million, or 25.9 percent, of the 1983 budget. See Unesco (n. 1 above), sec. 2, p. 36. 
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position because of their obvious need. Further, any resistance by one 
unit to outside development planners' proposals could be bypassed by 
planners approaching another unit. This strategy by development agencies 
of finding a sympathetic ear was enhanced by the ready availability of 
anxious listeners. The result was a widening of involved units, often with 
accompanying problems of coordination and agreement during project 
operation and completion. 
The vocational/technical (voc/tech) sector illustrated the problem of 
multiple units involved in and seeking control over project components. 
The Ministry of Youth and Sport (MYS) became involved in several voc/ 
tech projects under the second, third, and fourth education projects. 
Typically, the Bank Group plan to improve vocational/technical training 
was to build new institutions, principally the Agricultural and Industrial 
Training Board (AITB) (an administrative unit designed to set standards 
for voc/tech training and to oversee and license schools operating in the 
subsector), the Monrovia Vocational Training Center (a school for post-
secondary voc/tech training and apprenticeship), and the Commercial 
Training Center (a school for clerical training).43 
Conflicts between the MOE and the MYS delayed construction and 
implementation of all three projects44 and continued to hinder their op­
eration after completion. Problems were worsened by the duplication of 
MOE Division of Science and Technical Education functions by the AITB, 
a situation that resulted in neither unit being able to effectively design 
and oversee vocational and technical education. 
B. External Competition for Control of the Education Sector 
Like most developing countries, Liberian educational development 
has been a partnership between various elements of the Liberian gov­
ernment, Liberian educators, and international development and assistance 
agencies. During the period from 1972 to 1985, a sizable number of 
international agencies were involved in a diversity of Liberian development 
projects: Unesco, International Labor Office (ILO), United Nations De­
velopment Program (UNDP), USAID, International Development Agency 
(IDA), World Bank, African Development Bank, Peace Corps, and the 
U.S. Information Service (USIS). The involvement of these many agencies 
contributed to the drift and discontinuities in the Liberian education 
sector. 
43 Omitted from this list are a number of other vocational/technical projects that the MYS was 
not involved with but that did involve other international agencies and that did further fracture the 
vocational/technical education subsector. Some of these are discussed in the next section. 
44 Due to interministry problems and financial problems, the Commercial Training Center will 
probably never be built. 
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The sections above outlined the ways in which one pair of international 
agencies, working together,4 , produced a number of new units and pro­
grams that enhanced some aspects of Liberian education, but that also 
further disorganized the education sector due to policy changes over time 
and due to particular development strategies. These disorganizing and 
fractionalizing effects were multiplied as the number of separate agencies 
involved in development aid increased. The ways in which the effects of 
multiple agencies worsened the problems of looseness in the education 
sector were twofold: (1) as a result of processes that paralleled the ways 
in which single agencies created contradictions and discontinuities, that 
is, policy variations among agencies and policy changes over time within 
agencies; and (2) as a result of a new process that emerged when multiple 
development agencies were present, for example, interagency competition 
for control of the education sector. In the next sections we provide an 
example of how each of these operated. 
Interagency policy differences.—The Bank Group's Third Education Project 
allocated $2.5 million for the construction, equipping, and staffing of 
four Science and Technology Centers (STCs) attached to four high schools 
in the Liberian regional cities of Greenville, Robertsport, Sanniquellie, 
and Buchanan. The STCs represented an effort by project planners to 
address recurrent deficiencies in vocational/technical education as well as 
to offer a partial remedy to regional inequalities in Liberian secondary 
science education. The STCs were to be used by students of high schools 
in the city and surrounding communities to supplement their secondary 
education. The STC construction was scheduled for completion in 1980. 
By the time of our appraisal in 1985, none of the STCs was open and 
operating as planned, although three were built and one was in partial 
use. 
In order to rescue the STCs, and since no funds were allocated for 
them under the Bank Group's Fourth Education Project, the MOE obtained 
assistance from two American agencies—the Peace Corps and the United 
States Information Service (USIS). The focus of USIS/Peace Corps assistance 
was instructional (a focus consistent with the skills and orientation of those 
agencies) in the form of a project named Teacher-Text-Technology (TIT), 
begun in 1984. The U.S. Information Service provided technical assistance 
and instructional materials for the training of Peace Corps volunteers 
who initially staffed and subsequently trained Liberian teachers for the 
STCs. The curriculum to be employed retained the original STC science 
45 Although the World Bank (and its International Development Agency [IDA]) and the African 
Development Bank (ADB) are separate agencies, ADB and IDA assistance was incorporated into 
World Bank project plans, and so, in Liberia, interventions were coordinated. 
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emphasis, but the technology (vocational and home economics) component 
was deleted in favor of mathematics and language arts (two subjects pre­
sumably already being taught in the high schools, and not part of the 
original science and technology intent of the STCs). 
While the instructional assistance provided by the two American agencies 
was needed, the problems of the STCs went far beyond manpower shortages 
and involved mainly construction (the Bank Group's policy focus), program 
organization and coordination, and finances. The three constructed STCs 
had no running water (due to construction problems), little or no electricity 
(due to regional power shortages and electricity delivery system problems), 
inadequate or absent equipment (due to ordering problems, finances, and 
theft), no funds or procedure for reordering supplies, no transportation 
or plan for busing in students from neighboring high schools or com­
munities, and security and managerial problems. The TTT project's pro­
gram of training and staffing the STCs was dwarfed by the magnitude 
of the existing problems. And in fact, further problems arose as a result 
of the TTT project itself. 
In order to attract teachers to regional schools, the TTT project provided 
salary incentives to STC teachers. In a context of nationally low salaries 
and untimely salary payments, this disparity between STC teacher salaries 
and those of other Liberian teachers prompted a protest from the National 
Union of Liberian Teachers, which argued that the STC salaries violated 
MOE policy. The provision of instructional materials by the TTT project 
also illustrated the introduction of discontinuities in existing schooling 
policies and procedures by outside agencies. Although the Bank Group 
had financed the development and purchase of MOE-approved textbooks, 
non-MOE science, math, and language arts texts were obtained through 
the efforts of the TTT staff. Their use violated MOE policy and contributed 
diversity rather than continuity to the already diverse world of Liberian 
educational instructional materials.4*' 
The differences in policy orientation and approach between the Bank 
Group education projects and the USIS/Peace Corps TTT project illustrate 
the loosening effect such multiple actors can have on the education system. 
The next section describes a situation where policy differences between 
agencies escalated into a struggle for control over the Liberian primary 
education subsector. 
Interagency competition.—Organizational research suggests that one of 
the reasons for loose coupling is multiple external pressures on an or­
ganization. Multiple resource flows or multiple external power centers 
can exert diverse, conflicting pressures on an organization that responds 
by fractionalizing programs, subdividing functions, and proliferating units. 
46 At the time of the 1985 assessment, TTT staff had agreed to use MOE textbooks. 
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This is precisely what occurred in the Liberian primary-education subsector 
as a result of competition between the Bank Group textbook program 
and the USAID Improved Efficiency in Learning (IEL) project. 
Beginning in 1978, USAID funded the IEL project, designed, among 
other things, to provide an instructional system, including instructional 
materials, for use in Liberian primary schools. Simultaneously, under the 
Fourth Education Project the Bank Group funded a textbook program 
also designed to provide instructional materials for use in Liberian primary 
schools. As is typical of separately funded projects, the projects were 
distinct administratively and in their content and approach. Each project 
had its own project director, budget, and staff, and each project was under 
the control of a different deputy minister in the MOE. In addition, each 
project had its own teacher training program, supervisory system, cur­
riculum, and instructional materials, and the two projects were implemented 
in different schools. However, when the MOE and USAID decided to 
extend and expand the IEL project in the form of IEL-II (originally 
scheduled for implementation in 1984), the two projects embarked on a 
collision course. 
The reason for the impending collision stemmed directly from the 
independence of program funding. In order to obtain the resources nec­
essary for the development of its primary schooling system, the MOE 
looked to the funding environment and found the Bank Group and 
USAID. The two agencies' somewhat competitive stance toward one another 
(no doubt linked to each organization's relevant economic and political 
environment), their project administration by separate MOE branches 
(the result of the competition for external resources discussed above), 
and the differing content of the two programs challenged any efforts at 
coordinating the two projects. 
The result was an inevitable conflict between the two projects that 
took the form of a several-year struggle between USAID personnel, who 
refused to release IEL-II funds until an MOE commitment was made to 
make IEL the exclusive primary-education program in Liberia, and MOE 
officials, who steadfastly refused to abandon the use of Bank Group-
financed textbooks in Liberian primary schools.47 
By virtue of their (1) design—each to provide curricula, teacher training, 
supervision, and instructional materials for grades 1-6 in the primary 
schools, (2) administration—in separate branches of the MOE, and (3) 
intent—each to be the primary instructional system in Liberia, the success 
of either the USAID IEL project or the Bank Group textbook program 
challenged the success of the other. Unsuccessful efforts to reconcile the 
47 The conflict was still not resolved in December 1986, and the IEL-II project funds ($14 
million) were still frozen by USAID. 
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competition between these two separately funded projects underlined the 
power that external agencies can exert and the fractionalizing effects such 
competition can have.48 Whether the IEL textbook conflict was resolved, 
in favor of one system or the other or in favor of a solution that bifurcated 
Liberian primary education, remained to be seen. The resistance of the 
MOE to the latter solution testified to MOE's comprehension of the ed­
ucation sector's organizational and continuity problems and to a less des­
perate situation from that of an earlier era. 
VII. Conclusion 
The above analysis offers a partial explanation for the discrepancies, 
discontinuities, and difficulties typifying the development of the Liberian 
education sector. The loose coupling perspective described the structure 
of the education system and pointed to some of the forces that contributed 
to its particular shape and operation. We argued that educational expansion 
as denoted in enrollment and expenditure statistics is not an accurate 
picture of the realities of education in developing states. We further 
argued that international development funding, while helping to expand 
and enhance system segments, has also often unwittingly contributed to 
many of the problems of educational development in Liberia, and that 
Liberia was by no means unique in these problems. 
In conclusion, we do not wish to characterize educational development 
as development ex machina, where local planners and educators are depicted 
as mere puppets on the strings of international agencies. As we noted 
above, local competition for external resources exerts fractionalizing pres­
sures on the education sector as well. Our purpose here has been to 
identify the less obvious and unintentional role of international funding 
agencies in the problems of educational development, particularly in the 
fractionalizing of the education sector. 
48 C. W. Snyder, Jr., and J. A. Richard, "Accommodation or Competition: The IEL and the 
Fourth World Bank Education Projects" (Monrovia: Ministry of Education, 1984). 
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